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 In 2002 new regulations arrived for public companies listed in the U.S. through the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This regulation tried to impose more transparency in financial 
markets, implying less asymmetric information between firms and investors. The aim of 
this work is to verify if the regulation had the desired impact, comparing the dividend 
policy of firms before and after the introduction of this regulation. Thus, admitting that 
firms use dividend policy to signal our perspectives to investors, due to asymmetric 
information between investors and firms, a greater transparency should lead to an impact in 
the dividend policy. 
 









The purpose of this project is to assess if the regulation put in place brought more 
transparency to the markets. According to the Market Efficiency Hypothesis, the financial 
markets are efficient when new information disclosed to the markets is quickly and 
accurately reflected in the security returns. The normal process used to determine market 
efficiency is through an event study, as Haugen (2000) documented. However, I will study 
the changes in the dividend policy during a specified length of time to determine whether 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 turned this policy more transparent and brought less 
asymmetry between investors and firms. The literature on dividend policy is large and 
several studies were done with different and contradictory results regarding this subject. 
However, the dividend policy is an ample subject and could be approached in many 
different ways. 
The Securities Act of 1933, was the first regulation that took place in the U.S. financial 
markets for the primary markets. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 – for now on referred as 
Sarbox – is the most recent and important regulation for the financial markets in the U.S.A. 
The Sarbox consisted in reformulating the law regarding the corporate governance and 
accounting rules of the U.S. public companies, making those companies disclose more 
detailed information to investors and, therefore, protecting them. This reform was an 
answer to avoid the several accounting scandals that occurred, such as the known Enron 
and WorldCom cases, it was created to protect investors by improving the accuracy and 
3 
 
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws
1
. This act was 
signed on July 30
th
 of 2002 and is also known as Sarbox or SOX. 
Foreign companies listed in the U.S. stock exchanges also had to fulfill the Sarbox 
requirements.2 This law by itself was also involved in a considerable number of 
controversial discussions about the trade-off between the costs of losing listed companies to 
other non U.S. stock exchanges and the benefit of having more transparent accountability 
procedures. 
Before the reformulation of accounting, auditing and corporate governance laws, 
companies had the possibility to manage the dividend policy, perhaps signaling the 
company in a wrong way and transmitting to investors an incorrect idea. After the 
enactment of the Sarbox, it was expected that markets become more transparent for U.S. 
and foreign firms listed in the U.S. stock exchanges. In this paper I will test if the mean 
dividend yield changed before and after the regulatory change. 
The dividend yield is the way to measure the return in dividends for each dollar 
invested in a particular security. So, one investor that requires a high and stable dividend 
would seek a relatively high dividend yield. Campbell and Shiller (1988) also noticed that 
dividend-price ratio, as they called it, is also interpreted as reflecting the outlook for 
dividends and, alternatively, as reflecting the rate at which future dividends are discounted 
to today’s price, or both at once. Although, these statements were in line with the expected 
return predictability, and the goal of this work was to determine whether the dividend yield 
                                                          
1
 Source: http://www.sarbanes-oxley-forum.com/ 
2
 Deadlines from the fulfillment of Sarbox requirements: 
- Most public companies must meet the financial reporting and certification mandates for any end of 
year financial statements filed after Novermber 15
th
 2004 (amended from June 15
th
). 
- Smaller companies and foreign companies must meet these mandates for any statements filed after 
15
th







changed through one period to another, doing a parallelism with the market asymmetries 
between investors and firms.  
This paper purposes to analyze whether the mean dividend yield changed from one 
period to another. The first test to be performed is the test for differences between mean 
populations for an independent sample. Under the null hypothesis that the dividend yield of 
the Pre-Sarbox period is equal to the After-Sarbox period, it is expected that the null 
hypothesis would be rejected. The same test will be performed to determine whether the 
means are statistically equal between the Sarbox and the After-Sarbox periods. Evidence of 
the impact of the previous period’s dividends, prices and earnings on the dividend yield 
was provided through a Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression to prevent for 
heteroskedasticity. Serial correlation tests will be performed to get statistical results about 
the persistence of the dividend yield. It is expected that those variables have impact in the 
dividend yield since some of them are used to calculate the ratio per si and also because the 
empirical results already found by other authors showed evidence of the link between 
earnings and dividends.  
To perform the tests proposed, prices, dividends and earnings are used for the S&P 500 
index. The expectations for the first test were confirmed, suggesting that the Sarbox Act 
brought transparency to financial markets. For the second test the same applies, since in 
some way all variables have impact on the explanation of the dividend yield. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows: section 2 presents the literature review, 
section 3 describes the data and the methodology used, section 4 explains the empirical 





2. Literature Review 
 
A large literature has been developed in order to test the market efficiency hypothesis 
on the financial markets under the three known forms: weak, semi-strong and strong. Some 
examples of these three forms are very well documented by Haugen (2000). Most of it was 
centered in event studies that tried to explore the semi-strong market efficiency hypothesis, 
i.e., tried to capture the impact of historical and current released information to the markets. 
Inside traders try to exploit the inefficiencies of the market using privileged information 
to beat the market leading ultimately to more efficient stock prices’ behavior. Fishman and 
Hagerty (1992) found that insider trading has adverse effects, such as detecting traders that 
acquire private information, skewing the information from the general traders to the 
informed traders.  
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) compared the insider trading behavior and the cost of 
equity in different countries. Most countries were subjected to laws that do not allow for 
insider trading. However, not all those countries could enforce the law. They found that the 
simple establishment of insider trading laws is not sufficient to lower the cost of equity, but 
the enforcement of such trading laws is empirically far more significant. 
Several event studies were done regarding the impact of stock splits, dividend policies 
and earnings growth on the value of the firms. Lintner (1965) studied the changes of 
dividend policy and concluded that the increase in dividends is more due to management 
belief of earning permanent increase than to a signaling effect. 
 Earlier, Miller and Modigliani (1961) have found initial evidence that the signaling 
effect of the dividend policy leads to the ability of increasing the future earnings and the 
stock price change, mainly because of the information that dividend transmits to investors, 
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as corroborated by several later studies like Bhattacharya (1979) and John and Williams 
(1985). However, the idea that dividends are related to earning power is not so strongly 
supported by Nissim and Ziv (2001) and Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997). Instead, 
they argue that dividend changes have a modest and positive impact in excess returns that 
are related to the systematic risk and profitability in the next two years subsequent to 
dividend changes that one company faces.  Grullon, Michaely, Swaminathan (2002) 
concluded the same, but found additionally that investors may interpret dividend changes as 
“good” or “bad” news.  
The effect of the regulation in the market efficiency was studied by John J. Binder 
(1985) who argued that tests with stock price data are more powerful than those with 
accounting data since they (1) are more accurate, (2) provide greater number of 
observations and (3) measure better the isolate company-specific effect through specified 
models of expected returns. However, he found some limitations in his sample that could 
lead to some biases, such as: (1) the regulatory announcements can be anticipated and 
therefore the company can apply these regulations early; (2) the same industry can have 
positive or negative abnormal returns regarding their market capitalization; (3) one industry 
can benefit more of the regulatory change; and (4) under certain circumstances one can not 
know if the abnormal returns are cause by regulation or other industry-specific shock.. 
When performing an event study, one should be very careful with the methodology 
used in order to avoid biases referred in the estimates. John J. Binder (1998) points some 
problems in market model methodology, namely the dependence and/or the 
heteroskedasticity of the abnormal returns which can introduce bias in the event studied. 
The heteroskedasticity problem arose due to a variance of abnormal returns during an event 
- especially in the event date - were not constant. To solve these problems, he proposes to 
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eliminate cross-sectional dependence by combining securities experiencing the event in the 
same calendar month in a portfolio.  
Regarding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, few studies were done comparing the 
market asymmetries before and after this regulation. The existing few focused on the 
accounting impact of this regulatory change, rather than on the impact in the market 
transparency. Thus, this study will hopefully help filling the existing gap in the literature 
concerning the impact of the dividend yield ratio in the transparency of the markets before 
and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
 
3. Data & Methodology 
 
Daily dividends per share, daily earnings per share and daily closing prices were 
collected for the S&P 500 Index from the Bloomberg screens for the length of time from 
January of 2000 to December of 2008. The S&P 500 index was chosen as a good sample in 
terms of market capitalization and specifications. The stocks represented in S&P 500 Index 
are those of the largest public held companies listed in the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and NASDAQ.   









_ =  (1)  
 
 Divt and Pricet are the dividends and prices per share for each period t of the S&P 500 
Index, respectively. 2262 daily dividend yields were calculated for the S&P 500 index for 
the length of time since January 2000 to December 2008. To determine whether the Sarbox 
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had impact on the dividend yield is important to get a measure to value it. Therefore, it is 
important to know if the dividend yield increased or decreased after the implementation of 
the regulation put in place and if the change was statistically significant. To calculate some 
values and determine the significance of this analysis, I will determine the arithmetic 
average for the daily dividend yield for each of the following periods: (i) Pre-Sarbox, (ii) 
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The periods were divided as follows: 
(i) Pre-Sarbox period: this period is prior to the Sarbox. It captures the mean 
dividend yield of the index prior to regulatory changes. Observations since January 
2000 to July 30th 2002 were included, as this last date is when Sarbox was enacted;  
(ii) Sarbox Period: this period covers the mean dividend yield during the 
transition period to all aggregated firms represented in the S&P 500 Index. The data 
range ends on July 15
th
 2005, as the last deadline for foreign firms to fulfill the 
requirements; and  
(iii) After-Sarbox period: this period gathers dividend yields after the transition 
period, i.e., since July 18
th
 2005 to December 2008. The goal is to compare if the 
mean dividend yield is statistically equal between the two periods described above 
and this one. 
 
To evaluate whether the Sarbox brought transparency to the market or not, the criteria 
used was the statistical significance of the change of the mean dividend yield before and 
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after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. To determine if the change in the means between 
both periods had meaning, a test of differences between population means for independent 
samples was constructed under the null hypothesis that the means of the Pre-Sarbox vs. 
After- Sarbox and Sarbox vs. After-Sarbox periods are equal. Ayres, Cloyed, and Robinson 
(2002) also used this test across no-dividends and high-dividend firms for dividend yields 
among other variables. Assuming that the dividend yield has an asymptotically normal 
distribution, it was defined as the following test: 
H0: µx  = µy 
H1: µx  ≠ µy 
Where µx represents the Pre-Sarbox period, µy represents the After-Sarbox period for 
the first test; and µx represents the Sarbox period, µy represents the After-Sarbox period for 
the second test. I tested if there is a statistical significant difference between the mean 
dividend yields for both periods. To test whether the null hypothesis is statistically 
significant or not, the usual Student’s t test is not the most accurate one in this case, as 
Fermat, Schbert, Einstein, and Behrens-Fisher (2002) stated, since the underlying 
assumption of heteroskedasticity is violated. Clearly, the variances of both periods are not 
equal. There are two relevant tests in this case: (1) the Satterthwaite-Welch t-test and (2) 
the Welch F-test. Both tests are adaptations of the Student’s t-test and ANova F-test, 
respectively, assuming that the two samples have possibly unequal variances. 

















To calculate the degrees of freedom associated with this estimation, the Welch-
Satterthwaite equation is used: 
 


































Using the Welch F-test, 
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The numerator of the adjusted statistic is the weighted between group mean squares 
and the denominator is the weighted within group mean squares. Under the null hypothesis 
of equal means but possibly unequal variances, F* has an approximate F-function with (G-
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 Where : 
(1) 
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ggg nw σ= , where 
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,where hg is the anormalized weight; 
(3) gk xhx ⋅=∑* , where *x is the weighted grand mean. 
The subgroups designated are the Pre-Sarbox vs. After-Sarbox, or Sarbox vs. After-Sarbox periods this 
notation is only used for simplification. 
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There is another approach to determine some empirical results as done by the volatility 
of the dividend yield through the same periods of time, following the next formula: 












_σ  (7)  
 
Applying the tests of equality for variances, the Levene test strongly suggested that the 
variances differ across periods. 
In addition, multiple regressions were performed to determine if the sample in focus 
has the same empirical results as other studies done before, such as Miller and Modigliani 
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where, 
- α0, αi, βi and γi are the intercept and the slopes, respectively, of the linear 
relationship between the dividend yield and the different independent variables; 
- Div_Yieldt is the dividend yield for period t; 
- Divt-1 is the dividends of the previous periods; 
- Eart-1 is the earnings of the previous periods; 
- S&P_Pricest-1 is the prices of the S&P 500 index of the previous periods; 
- Timet is variable that explains the persistence of dividend yield; 
- µt is the zero-mean error term; 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
4
 Because the test is only performed for two subgroups, the Pre-Sarbox vs. After-Sarbox period, or the 
Sarbox vs. After-Sarbox periods, the G=2. 
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The WLS regression was also chosen because it is more efficient and the variance 
estimator is consistent under the assumption of heteroskedasticity rather than the usual 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model.  If the OLS model was used instead of the WLS, the 
estimated standard error would be wrong. Therefore, the Student t-Statistic and F-Statistic 
tests would not be the appropriated ones and the OLS estimator would no longer be 
BLUE5. Thus, the WLS model leads to new t and F-Statistics that have t and F 
distributions. Further tests on serial correlation of residuals were also performed to avoid 
major errors on the estimators. 
For daily observations, it is important to account for day-of-the-week effects and 
month-of-the-year effects; hence these tests were performed regarding the overall sample. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
The statistical tests analyzed in this section, show that both comparisons between 
dividend yield means of Pre-Sarbox vs. After-Sarbox and Sarbox vs. After-Sarbox periods 
changed after the implementation of the regulation. 
At first glance one can see that the mean dividend yield between the Pre-Sarbox to the 
After-Sarbox period had changed from 1.21 to 2.05, respectively, expectations being that 
the null hypothesis would be rejected. The same occurs between the Sarbox and the After-
Sarbox periods from 1.66 to 2.05, however the change is smaller in this case. Table 1
6
 
                                                          
5
 BLUE stands for Best Linear Unbiased Estimator. 
6
 All tables and figures mentioned are presented in appendix. 
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despites the descriptive statistics. The statistical tests helped to determine the significance 
of the mean change. 
The statistical tests performed for the differences between mean populations for 
independent samples and unequal variances, in this case equality tests between the Pre-
Sarbox vs. After-Sarbox and Sarbox vs. After-Sarbox dividend yield means, suggested that 
the null hypothesis is strongly rejected. Analyzing the Welch F-test for the jointly 
hypothesis, the Pre-Sarbox differs from the After-Sarbox mean in excess of 3310.695 (three 
decimal places) with a P-value associated of nearly 0.0000 (0.00%). Regarding the 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test, the results lead to the same conclusion since the means of both 
periods differ in shortage of approximately -57.5386 (four decimal places), also with a P-
value near to 0.0000 (0.00%). Table 2 gathers the results of this test. Regarding the same 
test performed between the Sarbox and After-Sarbox periods, the results lead to the same 
conclusion as the previous one, however the values are fairly smaller. For the Welch F-test 
the Sarbox differs from the After-Sarbox mean in excess of 641.3437 (four decimal places), 
but the P-value associated with remains nearly of 0.0000 (0.00%). In the case of the 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test the means differs in shortage of -25.3248 (four decimal places), 
also with a P-value near to 0.0000 (0.00%). 
For both tests the null hypothesis is strongly rejected, meaning that the mean dividend 
yield changed between one period to the other were significant. The results obtained 
corroborate with the research question in focus, suggesting that the Sarbox Act brought 
more transparency to the financial markets, removing asymmetries between firms and 
investors. Even though, it is important to notice that further external factors to the 
regulation could have a huge impact on this results. Analyzing the dividend yield during the 
length of time considered, we can see that the ratio increased in the mid-2007. This increase 
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was due to the decrease of the prices of the S&P 500 accompanied by a continuous increase 
of dividends per share. Recalling the economic history, at that time the subprime crisis 
arrived to the U.S. financial markets in which almost all U.S. stock exchanges felt the 
impact in the security prices. The late reversal on the dividends per share trend could be 
related to the reluctance of managers to reduce dividends, as Lintner (1965) suggested.  
Figure 1 despites the great volatility of the S&P 500 prices during the sample period, 
which had a major impact on the dividend yield ratio, in addition with the positive trend of 
the dividends per share. Shiller (1981) referred the popular discussion about the stock 
prices indexes volatility in general and argued that this variability could not be attributed to 
the changes in dividends, given that the information disclosed to the markets are not so 
often.  Therefore, these prices volatility affect the dividend yield.
7
 These results strongly 
support a crisis scenario, complying with the explanation of the reverse trend in the S&P 
500 prices. In such a scenario, investors could take advantage of market volatility as the 
expected returns increases. 
A different group of tests were performed regarding the impact of previous period 
dividends, prices and earnings on the dividend yield at time t. It was expected that all 
variables had impact, accordingly with evidence provided by the existing literature on this 
field. This estimation was performed until one year before, in other words the periods in 
focus were 3, 6, 9 and 12 months behind, corresponding to approximately 60, 120, 180 and 
240 business days. These periods are consistent with quarterly ex-dividend dates of major 
U.S. firms.  
                                                          
7
 By measuring the volatility of the dividend yield on (1) Pre-Sarbox, (2) Sarbox and (3) After-Sarbox periods, 
the result showed that was a notorious change from 11.69% to 40.52% in the standard deviation from the 





 month homologue period dividend seem to be statistically insignificant to 
explain the dividend yield at  1% significance level, with a test statistic (t-stat) of -2.3052 
(four decimal places), with a P-value associated of 0.0213 (2.13%). Dividends of 9 months 
before period are also statistically insignificant at  5% significance level, corresponding to a 
t-stat of 1.7547 (four decimal places) and with a P-value associated of 0.0795 (7.95%). 
Regarding the earnings impact, only the one year homologue period is strongly statistically 
insignificant, with a t-stat of -0.4005 (four decimal places) and a P-value associated of 
0.6888 (68.88%). In what concerns prices impact, the previous 60 days period seem to be 
statistically insignificant at 5% significance level, corresponding to a t-stat of 1.7498 (four 
decimal places) and with a P-value associated of 0.0803 (8.03%). In addition, prices of the 
homologue 9 months period is statistically insignificant with a t-stat of 1.3336 (four 
decimal places) and a P-value associated of 0.1825 (18.25%). The remaining variables all 
seem statistical significance in the explanation of the dividend yield of time t. 
The variable time has a positive impact in the dividend yield, since it is statistically 
significant with a t-stat of 29.5925 (four decimal places) and a P-value associated near to 
0.0000 (0.00%). This variable was employed because the model is non-stationary, as the 
time is passing the dividend yield tends to slightly increase. 
Moreover, when we analyze residuals serial correlation through the Durbin-Watson 
statistic, one should notice that there is positive serial correlation, as expected. This result is 
explained, once again, by the persistence of the dividend yield.8 Serial correlation problems 
in the time-series models are usually viewed as the most important problem, because of the 
larger impact in the standard errors and in the efficiency of estimators. It is difficult to 
                                                          
8
 To get a more accurate result, a Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test was performed, confirming the 
result with a t*R-squared test of 1730.99 (two decimal places), with a Chi-Squared Probability associated 
near to 0.0000 (0.00%). 
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control this problem when we study persistent variables in the model. Thus, the results 
could not be robust anymore. 
It is also important to account for dummies with such a high frequency data. For the 
day-of-the-week effect the results did not provide any pattern in which dividend yield is 
statistically different between business days. However, when we analyze the month-of-the-
year effects, August and September seem to have a negative impact in the dividend yield at 
10% significance level. October, November and December are the months with a greater 
dividend yield. The reason behind these results can be the high propensity of firms to 
increase the dividends in the end of the year.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The aim of this work was to show the positive impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on 
market transparency in financial markets, through the dividend yield. The tests performed 
that suggested these results were tests of equality between dividend yield means of different 
periods. To perform these tests, three blocks of periods were created in order to guarantee 
the separation of the effect of the regulatory change in dividend yields. 
As dividend polices usually convey information to investors, the dividend yield 
behavior was studied in order to understand whether or not the information asymmetry has 
been reduced due to the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Two main tests for mean 
equality were conducted using different periods: the first compared the change in mean 
dividend yield between the Pre-Sarbox vs. After-Sarbox periods; the second compared the 
Sarbox vs. After-Sarbox periods. Both tests suggested that the Sarbox had a positive impact 
on dividend yields due to the mean dividend yield change between one period and another. 
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However, it is important to argue that these results could be influenced by external factors 
that were not taken into account in this analysis. Thus, using the same methodology as the 
mean tests, volatility was measured to explain part of the dividend yield increased. 
Further tests were done to analyze the impact of dividends, earnings and prices of 
previous periods on the explanation of the dividend yield. The results obtained supported 
the expectations that all variables explained the dividend yield, confirming some known 
empirical evidence presented in other literatures. However, is important to emphasize that 
the variable is serial correlated, leading to less robust estimators. This result is expected, as 
the dividend yield is a quite persistent variable - the dividend yield of today, would be the 
dividend yield of tomorrow. When studying for month-of-the-year effects, the results 
provided evidence that the dividend yield is greater on the last months of the year, probably 
due to high propensity of firms to increase dividends. 
Succinctly, regulations seem to have an important impact in the transparency of 
markets, since it enforces firms to disclose more information to financial markets. The 
results obtained confirmed that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act had an important contribution to 


















Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
 OVERALL_SAMPLE PRE_SARBOX SARBOX AFTER_SARBOX 
 Mean  1.684460  1.209101  1.658364  2.047035 
 Median  1.672622  1.201941  1.610594  1.862015 
 Maximum  4.015815  1.558914  2.089353  4.015815 
 Minimum  1.004484  1.004484  1.376338  1.723382 
 Std. Dev.  0.438912  0.117439  0.187021  0.406976 
 Skewness  1.302743  0.278052  0.758173  2.176345 
 Kurtosis  6.439179  2.305961  2.329075  7.580563 
     
 Jarque-Bera  1754.606  20.53155  87.86766  1450.698 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000035  0.000000  0.000000 
     
 Sum  3810.249  753.2701  1271.965  1785.014 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  435.5667  8.578555  26.79232  144.2633 
     
 Observations  2262  623  767  872 
     
 
 




























Table 2 – Test for equality of means between Pre-Sarbox and After-Sarbox period 
 
Test for Equality of Means Between Series  
Date: 05/20/09   Time: 02:13   
Sample: 1 2262    
Included observations: 2262   
     
     
Method df Value Probability 
     
     
t-test 1493 -49.92290 0.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 1065.593 -57.53864 0.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 1493) 2492.296 0.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 1065.59) 3310.695 0.0000 
     
     
*Test allows for unequal cell variances  
     
Analysis of Variance   
     
     
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. 
     
     
Between 1 255.1421 255.1421 
Within 1493 152.8419 0.102372 
     
     
Total 1494 407.9840 0.273082 
     
     
     
Category Statistics   
     
     
    Std. Err. 
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean 
PRE_SARBOX 623 1.209101 0.117439 0.004705 
AFTER_SARBOX 872 2.047035 0.406976 0.013782 
All 1495 1.697849 0.522572 0.013515 
     
     
     


















Table 3 – Test for equality of means between Sarbox and After-Sarbox period 
 
Test for Equality of Means Between Series  
Date: 05/21/09   Time: 20:08   
Sample: 1 2262    
Included observations: 2262   
     
     
Method df Value Probability 
     
     
t-test 1637 -24.28868 0.0000 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 1257.044 -25.32477 0.0000 
Anova F-test (1, 1637) 589.9399 0.0000 
Welch F-test* (1, 1257.04) 641.3437 0.0000 
     
     
*Test allows for unequal cell variances  
     
Analysis of Variance   
     
     
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. 
     
     
Between 1 61.64480 61.64480 
Within 1637 171.0556 0.104493 
     
     
Total 1638 232.7004 0.142064 
     
     
     
Category Statistics   
     
     
    Std. Err. 
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean 
SARBOX 767 1.658364 0.187021 0.006753 
AFTER_SARBOX 872 2.047035 0.406976 0.013782 
All 1639 1.865149 0.376913 0.009310 
     
     
     














Table 4 – Impact of dividends, earnings and prices on the dividend yield 
 
Dependent Variable: DIVIDEND_YIELD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/31/09   Time: 18:10   
Sample (adjusted): 12/14/2000 12/31/2008  
Included observations: 2022 after adjustments 
Weighting series: H   
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 1.066551 0.026496 40.25317 0.0000 
DIVIDENDS(-60) 0.082492 0.004270 19.31911 0.0000 
DIVIDENDS(-120) -0.012032 0.005220 -2.305198 0.0213 
DIVIDENDS(-180) 0.009253 0.005273 1.754689 0.0795 
DIVIDENDS(-240) 0.011412 0.004166 2.739065 0.0062 
EARNINGS(-60) -0.059441 0.002633 -22.57154 0.0000 
EARNINGS(-120) 0.055795 0.005190 10.75115 0.0000 
EARNINGS(-180) -0.059915 0.005603 -10.69428 0.0000 
EARNINGS(-240) -0.001367 0.003414 -0.400506 0.6888 
S_P_500_PRICES(-60) 9.40E-05 5.37E-05 1.749809 0.0803 
S_P_500_PRICES(-120) 0.000265 5.20E-05 5.095211 0.0000 
S_P_500_PRICES(-180) 7.05E-05 5.29E-05 1.333641 0.1825 
S_P_500_PRICES(-240) 0.000860 4.86E-05 17.69035 0.0000 
TIME 0.001139 3.85E-05 29.59253 0.0000 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.917289     Mean dependent var 1.749950 
Adjusted R-squared 0.916753     S.D. dependent var 0.529243 
S.E. of regression 0.131262     Akaike info criterion -1.216342 
Sum squared resid 34.59729     Schwarz criterion -1.177487 
Log likelihood 1243.722     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.202083 
F-statistic 1713.019     Durbin-Watson stat 0.168000 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.903894     Mean dependent var 1.754993 
Adjusted R-squared 0.903271     S.D. dependent var 0.410331 
S.E. of regression 0.127618     Sum squared resid 32.70290 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.143589    
     









Table 5 – Month-of-the-Year Effect 
 
Dependent Variable: DIVIDEND_YIELD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/06/09   Time: 23:51   
Sample: 1/03/2000 12/31/2008   
Included observations: 2262   
Weighting series: H   
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 1.748113 0.013667 127.9094 0.0000 
DIVIDENDS 0.088900 0.000385 231.0637 0.0000 
S_P_500_PRICES -0.001544 1.12E-05 -138.0299 0.0000 
FEB -0.000344 0.009679 -0.035543 0.9716 
MAR -0.002770 0.009375 -0.295478 0.7677 
APR -0.009732 0.009541 -1.019952 0.3079 
MAY -0.007851 0.009507 -0.825818 0.4090 
JUN -0.011403 0.009532 -1.196361 0.2317 
JUL -0.012834 0.009420 -1.362419 0.1732 
AUG -0.015781 0.009311 -1.694927 0.0902 
SEP -0.016885 0.009522 -1.773252 0.0763 
OCT 0.022446 0.009198 2.440340 0.0148 
NOV 0.049899 0.009455 5.277339 0.0000 
DEC 0.046378 0.009400 4.933756 0.0000 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.963028     Mean dependent var 1.690972 
Adjusted R-squared 0.962815     S.D. dependent var 0.574866 
S.E. of regression 0.090888     Akaike info criterion -1.952197 
Sum squared resid 18.57008     Schwarz criterion -1.916770 
Log likelihood 2221.935     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.939270 
F-statistic 4504.257     Durbin-Watson stat 0.059735 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.959771     Mean dependent var 1.684460 
Adjusted R-squared 0.959538     S.D. dependent var 0.438912 
S.E. of regression 0.088288     Sum squared resid 17.52259 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.034496    
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